Nationcraft Analysis: France Fragmentation Trap 2026

France in 2026 owns almost every ingredient the Nationcraft corpus associates with a top-tier state. Its capital markets rank at the very top of the scale. Its workforce, its rule of law, its commercial base, and its infrastructure all sit near the ceiling. On paper this is a country built to reform itself at will. And yet a French prime minister has fallen roughly every few months since the 2024 snap election, the 2026 budget cleared the National Assembly only after two no-confidence motions were beaten back, and the country’s own economy ministry has floated the once-unthinkable phrase “IMF bailout.”

Call it the Fragmentation Trap: a state with world-class capacity and a parliament too divided to deploy it. This is the paradox at the center of France’s 2026 profile, and it behaves like a specific engineering fault with a specific location, rather than a vague national malaise. Reformers keep reaching for the famous playbooks that turned other rich democracies around. Those playbooks keep sliding off, because almost all of them run on a resource France has quietly lost: the ability to concentrate authority behind a single reform for long enough to finish it.

The uncomfortable irony is that France solved this exact problem once before. In 1958 the Fifth Republic was designed, deliberately, to end the governmental paralysis of the Fourth. The 2024-2026 hung parliament has re-created the paralysis the constitution was built to prevent, and the emergency tool for overriding it is now generating the resentment that makes the fragmentation worse. That loop is what this analysis pulls apart, variable by variable.

⚡ Speed Run Notes

About Yu-kai Chou

Yu-kai Chou is a Human-Systems Architect & Behavioral Designer and the creator of the Nationcraft Framework — an 18-variable diagnostic for matching a country’s structural profile to the reform packets that have historically worked under similar conditions. He has consulted for governments in eight nations, including Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the Kingdom of Bahrain, Singapore, Taiwan, the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, and South Korea, and has worked directly with President Zelenskyy’s team on post-war reconstruction priorities for Ukraine.

Chou’s prior framework — the Octalysis Framework — has been applied by LEGO, Microsoft, Porsche, Coca-Cola, Salesforce, and MrBeast, impacting over 1.5 Billion Users. He has taught the methodology at Harvard, Stanford, Yale, Tesla, Google, BCG, and IDEO.

His work has been cited by Harvard, Stanford, MIT, Forbes, Wall Street Journal, Wired, US Department of Energy, NIST, NSF, NCBI, US Department of Education, ClinicalTrials.gov, and Google Scholar — with 3,700+ more academic publications. Explore his books here.

This France analysis draws on the same Nationcraft method I have applied in advisory work across eight governments, several of them European democracies wrestling with the same coalition arithmetic now paralyzing Paris. France is the cleanest case in the corpus of a country whose trouble is coordination while almost every resource it needs sits already in hand, and that makes it the sharpest test of whether the framework can separate a capacity problem from a cohesion problem when the two are usually tangled together.

Understanding France’s Governance Predicament Through Nationcraft

Most commentary on France’s 2026 crisis reaches for one of two stories. The first is a debt story: a country that spends too much, taxes heavily, and has finally run out of road, with public debt climbing toward 120% of GDP by 2027 and the IMF sketching a path to roughly 130% by the end of the decade.¹ The second is a personality story: a president who called a snap election he did not need, a National Assembly that punishes every prime minister who tries to govern it, and a revolving door at Matignon.

Both stories are true and both are shallow. The Nationcraft read is structural. France is not failing because it is poor or because its leaders are uniquely inept. It is failing to convert genuine, measurable national strength into decisions, because the mechanism that converts strength into decisions has broken. A country can have the best engine on the grid and still finish last if the transmission is stripped. That is what the numbers show once you lay France’s eighteen variables side by side.

The corpus already contains close cousins of this pattern. The United States analysis named an “American Paradox” in which leading cultural drives are eroded by falling stability and rising tribalism. France’s version is more extreme on one axis and milder on another: its capacity is higher than almost anyone’s, and its fragmentation is now deep enough to freeze that capacity in place. Reading the two side by side is instructive, and it is exactly the kind of comparison the Nationcraft Framework exists to make disciplined rather than anecdotal.

What Is the Nationcraft Framework?

The Nationcraft Framework treats a country the way a systems designer treats any complex motivational environment. Instead of asking whether a policy is good in the abstract, it asks whether a policy fits the specific structural profile of the nation trying to run it. The core claim is blunt: policy effectiveness is decided by context-fit, not by policy quality. A reform that transformed one country can wreck another, and the difference is almost always in the preconditions rather than the design.

Nationcraft scores every nation on eighteen variables, grouped into three families. The cultural variables (V1 through V6) cover authority dynamics, collectivism, achievement orientation, time horizon, comfort with uncertainty, and the balance between specialization and equity. The histo-political variables (V7 through V13) cover stability, pragmatism, social stratification, non-partisanship, homogeneity, geopolitical leverage, and governance transparency. The economic variables (V14 through V18) cover land, labor, capital, commercial friendliness, and infrastructure. Scores measure ease of governance under a given strategy, not moral worth. A high authority score is not praise and a low one is not an insult.

Against that profile, Nationcraft matches a country to historical “packets” — bundled reform programs that actually happened, each tagged with the variable profile of the country that ran it. The framework grew out of the Octalysis Framework for behavioral design, extended from products and teams up to the scale of populations, and the bridge between the two is spelled out in the Nationcraft and nation-building primer. The point of the whole exercise is to stop reasoning by slogan. When someone says France should “just be more like Sweden,” the framework forces the real question: which Sweden, in which year, under which variable profile, and does France’s profile actually support the same move?

Why This France Variables Analysis Matters

France is the sixth or seventh largest economy on Earth, a nuclear power, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and one of the two load-bearing pillars of the European Union. When France cannot pass a budget, the tremor runs through the eurozone, through NATO burden-sharing debates, and through every capital that models its own politics on the French left-center-right template. A France that stays stuck is not a French problem. It is a European one.

It also matters because France is the corpus’s clearest natural experiment in separating two things that usually travel together. Most struggling states are struggling on both capacity and cohesion at once, which makes it hard to say which constraint binds. France is rich, capable, and transparent while being politically fragmented almost to the point of gridlock. That rare combination lets the Nationcraft Framework isolate the cohesion variable and show, cleanly, what happens when a high-capacity democracy loses the ability to coordinate. The lesson generalizes to every advanced democracy watching its own party system splinter, which is why this analysis sits alongside the framework’s other European reads rather than off in a corner.

The 18 France Nation Variables (2026)

Here is France’s full Nationcraft profile for 2026. Read it as a shape, not a scorecard: the interesting information is in which variables are high, which are low, and how they interact.

*Drift note on V7. The corpus score of 8 reflects France’s deep institutional stability, and I have kept it there rather than editing the underlying data. But it visibly overstates executive stability in 2026: four governments in roughly eighteen months, a snap election, and repeated prime-ministerial resignations. This is a single variable showing minor drift, well below the threshold that would trigger a re-scoring, and the tension it captures is not noise. It is the paradox. Institutions that are individually stable are producing a politics that is collectively unstable.

The Fragmentation Trap

Line up France’s two most extreme numbers. V16 Capital Quality sits at 9, the highest score in the corpus. Around it, V13 Transparency, V15 Labor, V17 Commercial Friendliness, and V18 Infrastructure all sit at 8. That cluster describes a state with every structural asset required to execute an ambitious reform: money, talent, institutions, market scale, and the physical plant to build on.

Now look at V10 Non-Partisanship, sitting at 4. That single low number describes a political system that has fractured into three blocs — a left alliance, a centrist bloc, and a nationalist right — with no two able or willing to combine into a durable majority. Every government since the 2024 election has been a minority government surviving vote by vote.² The result is a machine where the engine (capacity) is fully built and the transmission (cohesion) is stripped. Power is generated and then dissipated before it reaches the wheels.

This is why the trap is precise rather than moody. In Nationcraft terms, reform packets fall into two rough families. One family runs on concentrated authority: a leader or party gathers enough power to push an unpopular program through faster than opposition can organize. The other runs on distributed trust: rival parties and social partners agree to share the pain because they trust each other to honor the deal. France’s V10 of 4 locks it out of both. It cannot concentrate authority, because the parliament fragments it. And it cannot yet run on distributed trust, because trust is exactly the thing a V10 of 4 says is missing. A country needs a high V10 to do consensus reform and a high V1-in-practice to do authority reform. France in 2026 has neither in working order, which is the narrow ledge the Fragmentation Trap stands on.

The corpus has a name for the surrounding dynamic: the Governance Paralysis pattern, in which institutional capacity exists but cannot be mobilized because decision rights are too dispersed. France is the richest country ever to land squarely inside it.

Detailed Justifications: The Variables That Decide France

Four variables carry most of the analytical weight for France. Working through them in Nationcraft terms shows why the trap is structural rather than temporary.

V1 Authority Dynamics (7) versus reality. France’s constitution is one of the most executive-heavy in the democratic world. The presidency commands foreign policy, the nuclear deterrent, and a battery of tools for forcing legislation. On the Nationcraft scale that earns a 7. The catch is that V1 measures the design of authority, while governing requires the exercise of it, and exercise depends on a parliamentary base the president no longer has. A 7 on paper behaves like a 4 in the chamber. The single most French expression of this gap is Article 49.3, the clause that lets a government pass a bill without a vote unless the Assembly musters a majority to topple it. It is authority-in-a-can, and every time it is opened it buys a budget at the cost of legitimacy.

V10 Non-Partisanship (4) as the master variable. Almost every pathology in the French system routes back through V10. A high-capacity state with a high V10 is Sweden or Canada, able to strike cross-party bargains that outlast any single government. A high-capacity state with a low V10 is France in 2026, where each bloc treats a concession to another bloc as a betrayal of its own base. The three-way split is not a temporary polling artifact; it reflects a durable realignment in which the old center-left and center-right that used to alternate power have both been hollowed out. When V10 is this low, the ordinary tools of democratic bargaining stop clearing, and government by emergency clause becomes the default rather than the exception.

The capacity cluster (V13, V15, V16, V17, V18) as the cruel part. If France scored poorly on capacity, its paralysis would be tragic but ordinary. What makes it a genuine paradox is that the capacity is elite. V16 at 9 means the money to fund a transition is right there. V15 at 8 means the human capital to run it exists. V13 at 8 means the institutions to implement it are trustworthy. The reform France needs is not blocked by a missing resource; it is blocked by an inability to agree on how to spend resources it already has in abundance. That is a far more frustrating failure than mere poverty, because every actor can see the wasted potential and none can unlock it alone.

V8 Pragmatism (7) meeting V2 (5) and the ideology gap. France runs one of the most capable technocratic administrations on the planet — the finance inspectorate, the Council of State, the Treasury. That is the V8 of 7 at work, and it is why French budgets are technically sophisticated even amid chaos. But a technocratic executive negotiating with ideological blocs across a low-trust chamber produces a specific failure mode: the plans are excellent and unpassable. The 2026 budget is the case study. It was a competent document that survived only because the prime minister traded targeted concessions to the Socialists for their abstention, and it will have to be renegotiated from scratch the moment the arithmetic shifts.³

Put the four together and the diagnosis writes itself. France has the pragmatism (V8) and the capacity (V13-V18) to design world-class reform, the authority-on-paper (V1) to signal it, and the fatal shortfall in cohesion (V10) that prevents any of it from surviving contact with the National Assembly.

Five Reformer Playbooks France Should Reject

When a rich democracy stalls, its commentariat reaches instinctively for the canonical turnaround stories. Nearly all of them are the wrong template for France, and the Nationcraft reason is always the same: they ran on a concentration of authority France’s V10 of 4 cannot supply. Here are five that get proposed and why each misfits.

The Thatcher illusion

The Thatcher packet (SP-102) is the one French reformers cite most, and it is the most misleading. On the surface the comparison flatters: Thatcher’s Britain also scored low on non-partisanship (V10=4) and high on transparency (V13=9), a profile that rhymes with France’s. But Thatcher governed through first-past-the-post, an electoral system that converts a plurality of votes into a commanding majority of seats. That manufactured majority, topped up by the political capital of the Falklands and a decisive miners’-strike victory, gave her the concentrated authority to break vested interests. France’s electoral system does the opposite: it faithfully reflects a fractured electorate as a fractured parliament. The same low V10 that Thatcher overrode with a structural majority, France experiences as raw gridlock. Copying the policy without the majority-manufacturing machinery reproduces the confrontation without the capacity to win it.

The authoritarian shortcuts

The Park (SP-008) and Chicago Boys (SP-014) packets deliver spectacular headline numbers — South Korea’s GDP per capita rose nineteen-fold under Park — but both ran on authoritarian cover that a French democracy cannot and should not reproduce. The corpus records the cost bluntly: under Park, “democratic development completely sacrificed”; in Chile, inequality exploded to a Gini of 0.57 under a regime that disappeared its opponents. These are not reform templates for a Security Council democracy. They are reminders that concentrated authority is the active ingredient, and that France’s whole problem is being unable to concentrate authority by legitimate means. The nationalist temptation to admire a “strong hand” is really a wish for a V1 France’s constitution grants on paper and its politics refuses to deliver.

Five Historical Packets France Should Actually Study

The packets that fit France are the ones run by other high-capacity democracies that consolidated their finances through cross-party or social-partner bargaining rather than executive dominance. Each is a much better structural match than Thatcher or Park. The catch, and it is the crucial one, is that every one of them required a higher V10 than France currently has. They are not plug-and-play; they are the destination France has to build the road to.

Canada is the closest fit

Of everything in the corpus, the Chretien-Martin deficit elimination (SP-111) maps onto France most cleanly. Canada in 1993 was a federal democracy with real center-provincial tensions, a serious deficit, and a credit rating under threat — a rich country in a fiscal hole, which is precisely France’s situation. It closed a deficit worth 5.6% of GDP in five years without triggering a recession, and it did so through a systematic program review that tested every federal program against six questions rather than through ideological blitz. The variable lesson the corpus draws is the one France most needs to hear: “V13=9 transparency meant markets trusted the consolidation plan,” and Finance Minister Paul Martin’s deliberate under-promise-and-over-deliver budgeting rebuilt credibility budget by budget. France’s V13 of 8 is close enough to run the same play. What Canada had that France lacks is not capacity; it is a governing majority stable enough to see a five-year plan through, which routes straight back to V10.

Sweden, the Netherlands, and Austria: cohesion as the precondition

The three European consensus packets are the deeper lesson. Sweden’s 1990s consolidation (SP-109) worked because, in the corpus’s own words, “V10=9 low tribalism plus V13=9 high transparency enabled the cross-party consensus that made the bank guarantee credible.” The Dutch Wassenaar model (SP-112) worked because unions and employers trusted a tripartite deal enough to trade wage restraint for shorter hours, halving unemployment from around 12% to roughly 5% over a decade. Austria’s social partnership (SP-115) is the most encouraging of all for France, because Austria built its consensus machinery deliberately after the trauma of a 1934 civil war, proving that a divided society can manufacture cohesion rather than inherit it. Every one of these packets fits France’s capacity like a glove and fails France’s cohesion like a trap. Read that as the instruction rather than a contradiction. The precondition for the packet France needs is a level of V10 it does not yet have, which turns the sequencing question into a blunt one: how do you raise V10 at all?

The De Gaulle mirror

France’s own history holds the most pointed lesson. The De Gaulle packet (SP-103) is in the corpus for a reason: the Fifth Republic was engineered in 1958, in the corpus’s phrasing, to “establish a stable Fifth Republic with strong executive to end governmental paralysis.” The Fourth Republic had died of exactly the disease France has now, endless coalitions collapsing over insoluble arithmetic. De Gaulle’s answer was to concentrate authority in a strong presidency, and it delivered a decade of over-5% growth. The 2024-2026 hung parliament has quietly undone that fix. The presidency still holds its constitutional powers, but the parliamentary base that made them usable has fragmented, so France has drifted back toward Fourth Republic dynamics inside a Fifth Republic shell. The reflex is to reach for even more executive force — more 49.3, more presidential override — but that reflex now backfires, because each use of the emergency clause deepens the resentment that hardens the blocs. The tool that once cured the paralysis has become one of the things feeding it.

Strategic Implications: The Reform Before the Reform

The strategic conclusion follows directly from the variable structure. France’s binding constraint is V10. The deficit is the symptom that gets the headlines; the disease is the inability to sustain any deficit-reduction plan across a change of government. This reframes the entire reform sequence. The first move that matters is whatever raises the odds that a fiscal package survives the government that signed it.

That sounds abstract until you translate it into the corpus’s mechanisms. Raising effective V10 does not require the blocs to like each other. Austria’s chambers did not like each other; they institutionalized negotiation anyway, because the alternative was remembered civil war. Sweden’s parties did not merge; they built a fiscal framework — a binding expenditure ceiling and a surplus target — that took the annual budget fight off the table and made discipline structural rather than discretionary. That is the transferable move for France: shift the fights that currently topple governments into rules and institutions that outlast them. A multi-year fiscal rule with automatic mechanisms, negotiated once across blocs and then removed from the yearly knife-fight, would do more for France’s trajectory than any single spending cut, because it attacks the cohesion constraint instead of the symptom.

The corpus flags two enabling patterns that France should watch for and use. The first is the Crisis Window: fragmented systems sometimes cohere briefly under genuine emergency, and a bond-market scare or a credible IMF conversation could, perversely, create the one moment when blocs accept a shared framework they would reject in calm weather. The second is Technocrat Insertion, which France has already reflexively tried with its finance-inspectorate-led governments. The warning attached to that pattern is that technocratic competence without a cohesion base produces exactly France’s current outcome: brilliant plans that cannot pass. Technocrats can draft the fiscal rule, but only a cross-bloc political bargain can make it stick. Any reform strategy built on the assumption that a clever enough plan will bypass the V10 problem is building on the exact ground that has already given way four times.

Governance Strategy Recommendations

Translating the diagnosis into sequencing, the Nationcraft-consistent strategy for France runs in three phases, each attacking the cohesion constraint before the fiscal one.

The through-line is that France should stop shopping for a stronger hand and start shopping for a more durable handshake. Its capacity is not in doubt. Its ability to keep a bargain across an election is. Every recommendation above is a way to make agreements outlast the governments that sign them, which is the only lever that moves a country out of the Fragmentation Trap.

There is a sequencing warning buried in the table too. Phases two and three are the parts French governments already reach for: a credible budget, a promise to protect the social model. Phase one is the part they keep skipping, because building a cross-bloc rule is slow, unglamorous, and yields no ribbon-cutting. Yet skipping phase one is exactly why phases two and three keep dying in the Assembly. A consolidation plan with no structural cohesion underneath it is a plan waiting for the next confidence vote to erase it. The order is not optional. In a V10=4 system, cohesion is the load-bearing wall, and everything fiscal is finish work laid on top of it.

Comparative Context

France’s predicament reads differently once you place it beside its neighbors in the corpus. The Greece analysis is the fiscal mirror: Greece carries the eurozone’s highest debt ratio and reached discipline only through the brutal external anchor of a bailout, a “discipline window” France would rather not need. The Kosovo coalition stalemate shows the same V10 fragmentation in a small, poor state, which strips away France’s capacity variables and reveals just how much of France’s pain is cohesion rather than poverty. The United Kingdom’s compact fracture is the closest cousin: another old Western European democracy watching its governing consensus splinter, though Britain’s majoritarian system channels the fracture differently than France’s fragmented Assembly.

Pull the lens wider and the pattern sharpens. The Colombia polarization pendulum and the India mandate trap are both stories about what a low V10 does to a state, from opposite ends of the capacity scale. And the framework’s original European reads — the American Paradox of eroding cohesion atop leading capacity — put France in a recognizable family. France is not the first high-capacity democracy to trip over its own fragmentation. It is simply the one where the gap between what a country could do and what its politics let it do is widest right now. Reformers who have studied the Singapore and Argentina analyses will recognize the move: name the paradox, find its master variable, and refuse to prescribe a packet the profile cannot support.

The Nationcraft Framework in Practice

France is a clean demonstration of why the Nationcraft Framework insists on context-fit over policy quality. Every packet France’s reformers admire is a real success somewhere. Thatcherism worked in Britain. Park’s model built modern Korea. The Chicago Boys stabilized Chile. None of that makes them right for France, because a packet is only as good as its fit to the running country’s variable profile, and France’s profile rejects the concentration of authority those packets require. The framework’s job is to make that rejection legible in advance, before a government burns its political capital discovering it the hard way.

It also shows the framework’s constructive side. By isolating V10 as France’s master variable, Nationcraft does not just diagnose; it points at the intervention with the highest leverage. The corpus supplies working examples — Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria — of high-capacity democracies that raised or institutionalized cohesion and then executed the fiscal reform their capacity always supported. France can study those packets in the Nationcraft country-analyses library and read the method itself on the Nationcraft Framework hub. The analysis a country needs is rarely the one that flatters its instincts. For France in 2026, the instinct is to want a stronger leader, and the framework’s answer is that the constraint lives in the handshake between blocs, where no leader can reach alone.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the Fragmentation Trap in France’s Nationcraft profile?

France scores near the top of the corpus on capacity variables — V16 Capital Quality at 9; V13 Transparency, V15 Labor, V17 Commercial Friendliness, and V18 Infrastructure all at 8 — yet only 4 on V10 Non-Partisanship. The Fragmentation Trap is that authority scatters across three irreconcilable parliamentary blocs before that capacity can be deployed, so France can neither run the authority-based reform playbooks nor yet meet the trust preconditions of the consensus-based ones.

Why can’t France simply copy the Thatcher or Chicago Boys reform model?

Both packets ran on concentrated authority France’s 2026 system cannot manufacture. Thatcher governed through a first-past-the-post Westminster majority; the Chicago Boys operated under Pinochet’s authoritarian cover (V1=9). France’s hung parliament produces no governing majority, and its democracy rules out authoritarian shortcuts, so the delivery mechanism both packets depend on is missing.

Which historical packet fits France best?

Canada’s Chretien-Martin deficit elimination (SP-111, 1993-1998) is the most transferable: a federal democracy consolidated 5.6% of GDP through program review and under-promise/over-deliver budgeting without a recession, anchored by high transparency. Sweden (SP-109), the Netherlands’ Wassenaar model (SP-112), and Austria’s social partnership (SP-115) also fit France’s capacity, but each first required the cross-party trust France still has to build.

How does the Fifth Republic relate to the Fragmentation Trap?

De Gaulle’s 1958 packet (SP-103) built the Fifth Republic specifically to end the Fourth Republic’s governmental paralysis by concentrating executive power. The 2024-2026 hung parliament has re-created the very fragmentation the constitution was designed to prevent, and the emergency tool for overriding it, Article 49.3, now deepens the resentment that feeds the fragmentation.

Is France heading for an IMF bailout?

French officials have publicly raised the risk amid a debt load near 116% of GDP and rising, but France is a eurozone member with deep capital markets and a strong institutional base, so a classic IMF program is unlikely in the near term. The Nationcraft read is that the binding constraint is political cohesion (V10), not economic capacity, which is why the fix has to be political before it can be fiscal.

Explore More Nationcraft Analyses

Every country in the corpus is a different configuration of the same eighteen variables. If France’s Fragmentation Trap sharpened how you read the interaction between capacity and cohesion, the full Nationcraft country-analyses library collects the rest of the diagnoses, and the Nationcraft Framework hub lays out the method from first principles. The sibling analyses of Greece, Kosovo, and the Ukraine variable analysis are the natural next reads for anyone working the European cases.

Related Reading

• The Nationcraft Framework: the 18-variable method behind every country diagnosis.
• Nationcraft Country Analyses Library: the full index of published profiles.
• Nationcraft Analysis: Greece Discipline Window 2026: the eurozone’s fiscal mirror to France.
• Nationcraft Analysis: Kosovo Coalition Stalemate 2026: low-V10 fragmentation without the capacity cushion.
• Nationcraft Analysis: UK Reform Surge 2026: a neighboring democracy’s governing compact fracturing.
• Nationcraft: How Octalysis Applies to Nation-Building: the bridge from behavioral design to public policy.

Footnotes

1. France debt trajectory (~115.6% of GDP in 2025 toward ~120% by 2027; IMF path toward ~130% by 2030) and deficit figures: European Commission Spring 2026 economic forecast for France (deficit 5.1% of GDP in 2026 rising to 5.7% in 2027; debt 115.6% in 2025 exceeding 120% by 2027), economy-finance.ec.europa.eu; Euronews, “France’s economic outlook for 2026,” euronews.com.
2. Hung parliament since the 2024 snap election and the sequence of minority governments (Barnier, Bayrou, Lecornu): “2024-2025 French political crisis,” Wikipedia; Time, “What Comes Next for France After Another Government Collapse,” time.com.
3. 2026 budget adopted after two no-confidence motions failed, via targeted concessions to Socialist lawmakers: Al Jazeera, “France adopts 2026 budget after two no-confidence votes fail,” aljazeera.com.

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