Nationcraft Analysis: Sri Lanka Graduation Cliff 2026

On October 4, 2026, the IMF and Sri Lanka reached a staff-level agreement on the seventh review of the country’s Extended Fund Facility. Board approval will release about $345 million and bring total disbursements to roughly $2.7 billion.

Most coverage read it as another clean checkpoint in one of the decade’s better recovery stories. Growth of 4.2% in the second quarter of 2026, the eleventh consecutive quarter of expansion. Gross official reserves at $6.9 billion by end-August. Government revenue as a share of GDP roughly doubled since the program began, inflation in single digits, and external debt restructuring described by the IMF itself as largely completed.

Here is what almost nobody priced in: the program ends in March 2027.

Everything green on Sri Lanka’s dashboard is green inside the scaffolding of a four-year IMF arrangement. The review calendar substitutes for long-horizon planning the country has never sustained (V4=4). Program conditionality substitutes for transparency institutions it has not yet built (V13=3). The IMF’s seal substitutes for the capital-market trust it lost in the 2022 default (V16=2).

In five months, the scaffolding comes down. I call the pattern that follows the Graduation Cliff: the moment a reforming nation passes its final exam and discovers the exam was also the structure holding the building up. Sri Lanka is about to run the sharpest version of this test anywhere in the world, and the 18-variable Nationcraft profile says exactly which parts of the recovery are real and which parts are borrowed.

About Yu-kai Chou

Yu-kai Chou is a Human-Systems Architect & Behavioral Designer and the creator of the Nationcraft Framework — an 18-variable diagnostic for matching a country’s structural profile to the reform packets that have historically worked under similar conditions. He has consulted for governments in eight nations, including Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the Kingdom of Bahrain, Singapore, Taiwan, the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, and South Korea, and has worked directly with President Zelenskyy’s team on post-war reconstruction priorities for Ukraine.

Chou’s prior framework — the Octalysis Framework — has been applied by LEGO, Microsoft, Porsche, Coca-Cola, Salesforce, and MrBeast, impacting over 1.5 Billion Users. He has taught the methodology at Harvard, Stanford, Yale, Tesla, Google, BCG, and IDEO.

His work has been cited by Harvard, Stanford, MIT, Forbes, Wall Street Journal, Wired, US Department of Energy, NIST, NSF, NCBI, US Department of Education, ClinicalTrials.gov, and Google Scholar — with 3,700+ more academic publications. Explore his books here.

This Sri Lanka analysis extends the Nationcraft Framework reading published in June 2026, which diagnosed the Compliance Paradox: a state that passes every IMF review while the substrate underneath stays fragile. Five months later the question has sharpened: the program that organized the recovery now has an expiry date, and this piece maps which of the 18 variables can hold weight once the anchor is gone.

Understanding Sri Lanka’s Governance Landscape Through Nationcraft

Sri Lanka in late 2026 is governed by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, in office since September 22, 2024, with his National People’s Power coalition holding a commanding parliamentary majority. A left-populist movement that campaigned against austerity has spent two years executing one of the most orthodox IMF programs in Asia.

That tension is the single most interesting fact in the country’s Nationcraft profile. V8 (Pragmatism vs Idealism) scores 4 (an ideologically committed political culture), yet observed behavior since 2024 has been relentlessly pragmatic.

The explanation is not that the variable moved. The explanation is that the IMF program made pragmatism the only survivable option, the way a cast makes a broken arm hold straight.

The Nationcraft Framework treats this distinction as load-bearing. A behavior produced by a variable persists when conditions change.

A behavior produced by scaffolding reverts when the scaffolding comes down. Sri Lanka’s 2022 collapse (the fuel queues, the default, a president fleeing the country) was itself the reversion of an earlier scaffolded equilibrium, which is why the Nationcraft corpus carries it as a canonical failure packet (FP-007).

The June 2026 analysis of Sri Lanka’s Compliance Paradox established the first layer: this V-vector can pass reviews without rebuilding the substrate. This analysis is the second layer.

Graduation converts the Compliance Paradox from a chronic condition into an acute one, with a date attached: March 2027.

What Is the Nationcraft Framework?

The Nationcraft Framework is my 18-variable diagnostic for matching a country’s structural profile to the reform packets that have historically worked under similar conditions. It extends the same human-systems logic as the Octalysis Framework from products and companies to nations.

The 18 Nation Variables split into three families. Cultural variables (V1–V6) cover Authority Dynamics, Collectivism, Achievement orientation, Time Orientation, Uncertainty Adaptability, and the Specialization-Equity balance.

Histo-political variables (V7–V13) cover Stability, Pragmatism, Stratification, Tribalism, Homogeneity, Geopolitical Leverage, and Transparency. Economic variables (V14–V18) cover Land, Labor, Capital, Commercial Friendliness, and Utility Infrastructure.

The core thesis of Nationcraft: policy effectiveness is decided by context-fit, and context is measurable. The corpus behind this analysis holds 147 country scorecards and over 100 historical Success Packets, from the Meiji Restoration to Botswana’s diamond management, each tagged with the variable preconditions under which it worked.

A packet that transformed one country routinely destroys another. The variables, and the interactions between them, are what decide which way it goes.

Why This Sri Lanka Variables Analysis Matters Now

Three audiences need this diagnosis before March 2027, and none of them sit in a ministry.

Investors and lenders are about to re-price a country whose sovereign signal has been outsourced to the IMF for four years. When the eighth review closes, the question stops being “did they pass?” and becomes “who certifies them now?”, and the V-vector answers it better than any ratings agency.

Analysts of reform need Sri Lanka as the cleanest live case of a question the Nationcraft corpus asks constantly: can a program change variables, or only behavior? The Ghana Bailout Cycle analysis documented a country on its seventeenth IMF arrangement precisely because each program changed behavior for exactly as long as it ran.

And Sri Lankan citizens, the people who paid for stabilization through cost-recovery tariffs and compressed real incomes, deserve a framework for judging what their sacrifice actually bought. If the answer is “a dashboard that greens while the program runs,” they are owed that truth before the next election, not after the next crisis.

The 18 Sri Lanka Nation Variables

These are Sri Lanka’s current scores in the Nationcraft corpus, sanity-checked this week against IMF program documents, central bank releases, and governance indices. Scores run 1–9 and measure governability characteristics, never moral worth.

Configuration is strategy: the scores are read as a system, never averaged.

Two minor drifts were logged in this review cycle (V7 and V16 trending up one point each), and both drifts are program-dependent, which is the entire point of what follows.

The Graduation Cliff

Every country that enters an IMF program with weak variables faces the same hidden design flaw: the program works by substituting for the variables rather than building them.

Sri Lanka’s configuration makes the substitution unusually complete. The cluster that matters is V16=2 + V4=4 + V13=3, carried by V15=7.

High labor quality means the state can execute a program: a literate civil service and a competent central bank pass reviews. Weak capital, short time orientation, and low transparency mean the state cannot yet generate what the program provides: borrowing trust, a planning horizon, and credible numbers.

The June analysis diagnosed the chronic condition. The acute one arrives on a schedule:

Notice the shape. The obligations rise as the anchor is withdrawn, which means Sri Lanka’s hardest post-crisis year is scheduled to be its first unsupervised one.

This is the same geometry the Zambia Model-Debtor Trap analysis found in Lusaka: the reward for being a model program country is the removal of the structure that made the modeling possible. And the serial version of it is Ghana’s seventeen arrangements, or the permanent version in the Pakistan Borrower’s Gavel analysis, where the IMF relationship became a governing institution in its own right.

An IMF official said in mid-October that the Fund stands ready to support Sri Lanka beyond the current program. That sentence should be read as a diagnosis, not reassurance: the people closest to the dashboard are hedging against the cliff too.

Detailed Justifications: Reading Each Variable

Cultural Variables (V1–V6): A Society That Can Absorb Shock

V1 Authority Dynamics at 7 reflects an executive presidency and a governing coalition with a parliamentary supermajority: unusual concentration for a competitive democracy. For reform purposes V1=7 cuts both ways: decisions can be made quickly, and mistakes can be made just as quickly, which is how the 2019 tax cuts happened.

V2 Collectivism at 8 is Sri Lanka’s deepest cultural asset. Village, temple, and family networks absorbed a 2022 shock that would have produced mass violence in a more atomized society.

V3 at 5 and V6 at 5 mark genuine midpoints: an education-proud culture that also prizes harmony, and a universalist welfare inheritance beside specialized export sectors. V5 Uncertainty Adaptability at 6 was proven live during the crisis, when queues reorganized into networks of mutual aid rather than riots.

V4 Time Orientation at 4 is the quiet killer in this family. Sri Lankan politics runs on electoral and crisis cycles, and every long-horizon institution the country has operated under lately (the EFF calendar, the debt-restructuring timetable) was imported.

Histo-Political Variables (V7–V13): The Scaffolded Middle

V7 Stability at 3 carries the 2022 baseline: a sovereign default, a storming of the presidential residence, a president resigning from abroad. Current stability is real but two years old and program-framed, which is why the corpus holds the score while logging observed drift to 4.

V8 Pragmatism at 4 produces this analysis’s strangest data: an idealist movement governing like technocrats. The Nationcraft reading is that V1=7 concentration plus program conditionality is doing the pragmatism, and the variable itself remains untested until the conditionality ends.

V9 Stratification at 6 and V10 Tribalism at 3 interact dangerously with austerity. Every cost-recovery tariff distributes pain across caste, class, and ethnic lines simultaneously, and V10=3 means the distribution is read ethnically whether intended or not. The northern provinces’ incomplete reconciliation makes fiscal policy a communal signal.

V11 Diversity at 4 compounds that: three languages and four religions mean no single national story carries a sacrifice narrative to everyone. V12 Geopolitical Leverage at 3 describes a country that is courted (Indian port and energy investments, Chinese infrastructure legacy) without initiating. Positional leverage pays in options and charges in autonomy.

V13 Transparency at 3 is the variable the program has substituted for most directly. IMF reviews functioned as an external audit office. A CPI score of 32/100 says the domestic version has not yet been built, and one reformist electoral cycle is not a track record.

Economic Variables (V14–V18): One Strong Spoke

V15 Labor at 7 is the strong spoke: roughly 92% literacy, an English-speaking professional class, and a global diaspora that functions as both remittance engine and skills reserve. V15 is why Sri Lanka executes programs well. It is also why its 2022 collapse shocked observers who mistook execution capacity for structural health.

V16 Capital at 2 is the broken spoke. The bond exchange is done and the IMF calls restructuring largely completed, yet market access remains unproven and the default is still the reference event. Capital trust is the slowest variable in the whole framework to rebuild, and it is precisely the one graduation tests first.

V14 at 6 offers diversified but low-margin resources: tea, gems, tourism geography. V17 Commercial Friendliness at 3 reflects regulatory friction plus the short-run cost of honest pricing: cost-recovery tariffs raised input costs for every exporter. V18 Infrastructure at 3 means the grid and transport network still tax every transaction they are supposed to carry.

Six Reformer Playbooks Sri Lanka’s Configuration Rejects

The Nationcraft corpus matches a V-vector against the preconditions of more than 100 historical Success Packets. The method owes its format to the Venezuela reform playbooks analysis: before asking what a country should study, establish what its configuration rejects, because the rejected list is usually where the policy conversation is actually happening.

For Sri Lanka at graduation, six celebrated packets fail the precondition test.

SP-002: The Lee Kuan Yew Industrialization Packet (Singapore, 1965–1990)

Every South Asian reformer eventually reaches for Singapore, and the comparison flatters Sri Lanka’s V15=7 labor quality. Colombo’s professional class resembles the material LKY worked with.

The packet still fails on four variables. LKY ran V1=9 authority compounded over 25 years of continuity; Sri Lanka has V1=7 inside a competitive democracy where the next election is always closer than the next decade. The packet needed V13 rising toward incorruptible-state levels within its first decade; Sri Lanka starts at 3. It needed V4 long-horizon planning as a cultural input, and it needed a city-state’s V18 infrastructure density, against Sri Lanka’s 3.

The full stress test is in the Singapore LKY packet analysis: this packet is the most precondition-hungry in the corpus. Importing its instruments without its variables produces Hambantota: infrastructure ambition at Singapore scale with V16=2 capital discipline, which is a line item in Sri Lanka’s own failure packet.

SP-008: The Park Chung-hee Industrialization Packet (South Korea, 1961–1979)

The Korean packet seduces for the same reason: educated labor, export orientation, a disciplined bureaucracy. South Korea in 1961 scored lower than Sri Lanka today on several economic variables, which makes the packet look reachable.

Its engine is unavailable. Park’s model ran on directed credit through captive banks. The state pointed capital at chaebols and absorbed the losses of the misses. That requires either deep domestic capital or unlimited external patronage; Sri Lanka’s V16=2 supplies neither, and its restructured creditors would read directed credit as the first step toward default number two.

The deeper mismatch is V2 collectivism’s direction. Korea’s packet mobilized collectivism into national production campaigns under V1=8 command; Sri Lanka’s V2=8 is organized around village, caste, and temple. That is horizontal solidarity, which absorbs shocks brilliantly (see V5=6) and resists vertical mobilization. The modern afterlife of the Korean state’s concentration habit is traced in the South Korea Post-Martial analysis.

SP-033: The Fujimori Shock Therapy Packet (Peru, 1990s)

Peru 1990 is the packet reformers cite when inflation and insurgency have broken a state and speed seems to justify everything. It stabilized prices, and it hollowed every institution it touched on the way; the autogolpe was the packet’s logic completing itself.

Sri Lanka fails it on both sides. Its crisis shape is wrong: the 2022 problem was external debt and FX collapse, already stabilized by conventional means, so shock adds pain without adding stabilization. And its V10=3 ethnic tribalism makes concentration catastrophic: a Fujimori-style executive bypass would be read communally within one news cycle, in a country one generation from civil war.

Peru’s own sequel is instructive: the Peru Carousel Trap analysis counts the cost still being paid in presidential turnover three decades later. A shock packet spends institutional capital that this configuration cannot afford to lose.

SP-050: The Convertibility Packet (Argentina, 1991–2001)

The Argentine convertibility packet is the purest expression of the idea Sri Lanka must now resist: outsource credibility to an unbreakable external rule, because your own V13 and V16 cannot generate it.

For a decade it worked, then the rigidity that made it credible made it unexitable, and 2001 delivered the largest sovereign default of its era. The structural rhyme with Sri Lanka’s situation is uncomfortable: an IMF program is also borrowed credibility with an exit problem, just with a kinder exit ramp.

The packet’s modern echo, documented in the Argentina Anchor Trap analysis, is that anchors imported to substitute for weak variables eventually present a bill in the currency of the variable they replaced. Sri Lanka should study convertibility as a mirror, never as a method. Bolivia’s Decree 21060, the corpus’s other famous stabilization-by-rule packet (SP-118), fails here for the same reason with a different disease: it kills hyperinflation, and Sri Lanka’s problem is trust, not price velocity.

SP-114: The Banking Collapse Response Packet (Iceland, 2008–2012)

Iceland is the romantic favorite: let the banks fail, protect depositors, prosecute the bankers, recover fastest in the crisis class. Its preconditions are almost comically absent in Sri Lanka.

Iceland ran the packet through referendums on V13=8 transparency and V11=9 homogeneity: 330,000 people with one language and one story, able to allocate losses by consensus without the allocation being read as sectarian. Sri Lanka’s V13=3 and V11=4 mean loss allocation is the most communally explosive act its politics can perform.

The packet also solved a banking crisis; Sri Lanka’s was sovereign. The instrument does not transfer across that boundary. You cannot let the state fail and protect its depositors.

SP-111: The Chrétien-Martin Deficit Elimination Packet (Canada, 1993–1998)

This is the subtlest rejection, because the surface fit is lovely: a center-left government eliminating a deficit of nearly 6% of GDP through program review and honest budgeting, reaching surplus in five years without recession. A Wall Street Journal editorial had called Canada an honorary member of the Third World; by 1998 the taunt was dead. Is this the NPP’s roadmap?

Read the preconditions. The packet ran on V13=9 transparency and V7=9 stability. Markets believed Ottawa’s numbers instantly, so consolidation bought credibility at par. Sri Lanka’s V13=3 means identical fiscal arithmetic buys a fraction of the trust, and the balance has been supplied by IMF review certification. Remove the reviews and the exchange rate on honesty collapses back to the domestic V13.

Canada teaches a direction (under-promise, over-deliver, protect the social story of the cuts) while its arithmetic stays out of reach: a lesson, never a playbook. What Canada’s own configuration does with external dependency is a separate story, told in the Canada Branch-Plant Trap analysis.

Three Playbooks Worth Studying Instead

What fits a V15=7 / V16=2 / V13=3 / V10=3 configuration exiting external supervision? Humbler packets, from countries that grew without ever fixing their institutions first, or that held fiscal discipline after the program left.

SP-055: The Caribbean Growth Model Packet (Dominican Republic, 1996–2016)

The Dominican Republic is the corpus’s standing rebuke to institutions-first sequencing: two decades as Latin America’s fastest-growing economy, built on tourism, remittances, free-trade zones, and eventually mining, with middling transparency throughout.

The variable logic maps cleanly onto Sri Lanka. The DR built on V14 geography and a US-concentrated diaspora; Sri Lanka holds V14=6 tourism geography on the Indian Ocean’s busiest corridor and a diaspora that already carried the country through 2022 remittance by remittance. Neither economy needed V13 to clear 5 before growth compounded, because service exports forgive institutional weakness in ways sovereign borrowing never does.

The packet’s failure list is the homework: the DR never fixed electricity, and its education never caught its growth. For Sri Lanka that reads V18 and the V15 pipeline: the two investments the packet says must be made during the growth run, because growth will not make them automatically.

SP-083: The Tourism & Diaspora Development Packet (Jamaica, with the post-2010 fiscal turn)

Jamaica is the packet to study with a highlighter in each hand. One color for the warning: four decades of near-zero per-capita growth, a middle-income trap with excellent music. One for the lesson Sri Lanka needs most: after 2010, Jamaica executed one of the developing world’s most disciplined fiscal consolidations (debt-exchange plus sustained primary surpluses) and, critically, held the discipline through IMF program completion and multiple changes of government.

The mechanism was a domestic compact: an oversight structure where opposition, private sector, and civil society co-owned the fiscal targets, making the discipline politically expensive to abandon. That is the single transferable instrument for a V13=3 country losing its external auditor: build a domestic one with constituencies, so the credibility survives the IMF’s exit.

Jamaica’s warning half also stands: discipline without a growth engine stabilizes you into stagnation. Which is why this packet is studied alongside SP-055 rather than instead of it.

SP-039: The Kibaki Economic Revival Packet (Kenya, 2002–2013)

Kenya 2002 is the closest emotional analog to Sri Lanka 2024: an electorate exhausted by misrule handing a reform mandate to outsiders, with donors watching and corruption the headline promise.

What worked was sequencing by visibility. Free primary education delivered a universal, tangible benefit within months, buying patience for slower reforms, while the state got out of the way of private innovation (the era that produced M-Pesa). GDP per capita roughly quadrupled in dollar terms over two decades.

What failed is the warning label: corruption survived the anti-corruption government, and the 2007 election violence showed unmanaged V10 tribalism can erase five years of gains in a month. Kenya’s own later chapter with concession-led debt is traced in the Kenya Concession Trap analysis. For Sri Lanka, with V10=3 and a northern reconciliation still unfinished, the packet’s real instruction is that the quick wins must be visibly cross-communal or they become grievance accelerants.

Governance Strategy Recommendations

These are written for the general and reformist reader (the analyst, the voter, the diaspora professional deciding whether to send capital home) as a specification of what crossing the Graduation Cliff would require. The beneficiary in every line is the population; the test of every step is whether it opens the system.

The ordering is the content. A V13=3 country must build its replacement auditor while the external one still works, because starting after March 2027 means starting with no certification at all.

And the phase-5 warning deserves its own sentence: the fastest way back to 2022 is celebrating graduation with a bond issue.

Strategic Implications

For reform watchers, the November 2026 budget is the single document to read. Written under conditionality and executed beyond it, it doubles as the first honest measurement of V8 pragmatism since 2024.

For investors, the Nationcraft reading says the IMF seal has been doing V16’s job. Post-program spreads should price the domestic substitutes (phase 1 above) rather than the final review’s grade; a clean eighth review with no domestic compact behind it is a sell signal wearing a diploma.

For the region, Sri Lanka is the test case every post-default sovereign is watching: the most closely tracked graduation in the 2022 default class. A successful crossing writes a new packet for the corpus; a failed one hands V12=3 leverage dynamics another demonstration, because a re-stranded Sri Lanka will be courted all over again by lenders who price desperation (the dynamic the Bangladesh Charter Trap analysis tracks one strait away, where a new government is negotiating its own successor program).

For the citizens who funded stabilization, the implication is a question to carry into the next election: which parts of the recovery exist when nobody is reviewing? That is the only honest definition of success this analysis can offer.

Comparative Context

Sri Lanka’s graduation profile against the IMF-cycle siblings in the Nationcraft library:

The pattern across the row set: countries exit the IMF cycle when they build a domestic substitute for the program’s function, and re-enter when they merely complete the program. Completing a program and building its replacement are different achievements, and only the second one keeps a country out of the next arrangement. The Bolivia Second Dose analysis and the Saakashvili packet analysis bracket the same lesson from opposite ends — one shows stabilization without institutions decaying on schedule, the other shows institutions built so fast they stayed personal instead of structural.

The Nationcraft Framework in Practice

This analysis ran the standard Nationcraft sequence: score the 18 variables against current evidence, find the interaction cluster that generates the country’s binding constraint, name the pattern, then filter 100+ historical packets by precondition fit rather than by prestige.

The Graduation Cliff now joins the corpus’s growing taxonomy of IMF-cycle patterns — alongside the Compliance Paradox, the Model-Debtor Trap, and the Bailout Cycle — as the acute, dated form of the genus: what happens in the specific quarter the anchor lifts.

Every analysis in this series is built to be checked against the next one. When Sri Lanka’s eighth review closes, this page’s phase table becomes falsifiable — which is exactly how a framework earns the right to keep diagnosing.

Explore More Nationcraft Analyses

The Nationcraft Nation Variables Library holds the full set of country analyses, each with its 18-variable wheel and named pattern.

Closest siblings to this one: the Thailand Showcase Trap (what IMF-meeting applause is worth), the Mozambique Pre-Spent Windfall (spending credibility before it arrives), and the Argentina Pampas Paradox (the long cost of serial default).

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the Graduation Cliff?

The Graduation Cliff is the Nationcraft pattern where a country completes an IMF program and loses, on a single date, the external structures that were substituting for its weak variables — planning horizon (V4), audit credibility (V13), and borrowing trust (V16). Sri Lanka reaches it in March 2027, when its Extended Fund Facility expires.

Didn’t Sri Lanka already prove itself by passing seven reviews?

It proved execution capacity, which was never in doubt given V15=7 labor quality. Reviews test behavior under supervision; the cliff tests variables without it. The June 2026 Compliance Paradox analysis covers why those two things diverge in this configuration.

Why reject the Singapore and South Korea playbooks when their starting conditions looked worse?

Because their packets consumed variables Sri Lanka does not hold: compounding single-authority continuity (V1=9 over decades), directed-credit capital machinery, and vertically mobilizable collectivism. Precondition fit, never outcome envy, is how Nationcraft matches packets.

What is the single most important thing to watch before March 2027?

The 2027 budget, tabled in November 2026 as a condition of the seventh review and executed after the program ends. It is the first document of post-supervision fiscal behavior, and whether a domestic oversight compact forms around it is the phase-1 test this analysis sets.

Could the IMF simply extend its support?

A successor arrangement is possible, and a senior official has said the Fund stands ready to support Sri Lanka beyond the current program. The Nationcraft reading: a voluntary successor program negotiated from stability would be a tool, while a necessary one negotiated from stress would be the Ghana pattern beginning — the difference is which side asks first.

Related Reading

• The Nationcraft Framework: 18 Variables, 8 Goals, 100+ Proven Reform Packets
• Nationcraft Nation Variables Library — All Country Analyses
• Nation Variable Analysis: Ukraine (2026)
• Nationcraft Analysis: Qatar Mediator’s Mortgage 2026
• Nationcraft Analysis: Kuwait Future Generations 2026
• Nationcraft: How Octalysis Applies to Nation-Building and Public Policy

Footnotes

1. IMF Press Release No. 26/318, “IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on the Seventh Review under the Extended Fund Facility with Sri Lanka,” October 4, 2026. imf.org
2. Central Bank of Sri Lanka, press release on the seventh-review staff-level agreement (SDR 254 million ≈ US$345 million; cumulative SDR 2.032 billion ≈ US$2.7 billion; conditions: 2027 budget presentation and financing-assurances review), October 5, 2026. cbsl.gov.lk
3. IMF Country Report, Sri Lanka — Extended Fund Facility arrangement schedule (eighth review on or after March 1, 2027; arrangement expiry March 2027). imf.org
4. IMF Asia-Pacific Department, Regional Economic Outlook press briefing transcript (11 consecutive quarters of positive growth; revenue ratio roughly doubled; restructuring largely completed), October 15, 2026. imf.org
5. Newswire.lk, “IMF ready to support Sri Lanka beyond current programme — senior official,” October 15, 2026. newswire.lk
6. Parliament of Sri Lanka, Heads of State handbook (Dissanayake in office September 22, 2024). parliament.lk
7. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2024 — Sri Lanka: 32/100, rank 121/180. transparency.org

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