Nationcraft Analysis: Cameroon Succession Trap 2026

Cameroon is the rare country where the most important political fact is a birthday. President Paul Biya turned 93 in February 2026, and the entire architecture of the state now bends around the question of what happens when he is gone. That is not a normal way for a nation of 28 million people, sitting on oil, timber, cocoa and one of Central Africa’s most educated workforces, to organize its future.

Here is the paradox that the Nationcraft Framework surfaces immediately, and I will name it in the first breath because it governs everything that follows: the Indispensable-Man Trap. The personalization of power that should give Cameroon continuity is precisely what guarantees rupture. Four decades of building a state around one man means there is no machine that survives the man. A richly endowed country has quietly made national survival a function of a single mortality.

In October 2025, Cameroon held a presidential election that the Constitutional Council awarded to Biya with 53.66 percent of the vote.¹ His leading challenger, Issa Tchiroma Bakary, rejected the count, claimed victory himself, and then fled the country. Security forces killed somewhere between the 16 the government admitted and the 30 to 55 that independent monitors counted.² Six months later, in April 2026, parliament rewrote the constitution to recreate a vice-presidency abolished in 1972.³ Both events are symptoms of the same diagnosis.

This analysis runs Cameroon’s full 18-variable profile, names the historical patterns it is sitting inside, and does the part most commentary skips: it identifies which reform playbooks would actually fit a country with this exact configuration, and which celebrated success stories would shatter against it. The endowment is real. The trap is structural. Telling them apart is the whole job.

⚡ Speed Run Notes

About Yu-kai Chou

Yu-kai Chou created the Nationcraft Framework, applying behavioral design to the hardest motivational problem there is: getting an entire population to move through structural reform without losing momentum. As of 2026, the framework has informed advisory work with eight governments: Taiwan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Bahrain, South Korea, Singapore, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. The same 8 Core Drives that have driven design at Microsoft, Porsche, and MrBeast now anchor nation-scale reform sequencing: diagnosing where motivation is broken, which drives to lean into for each phase, and how to sequence the political asks so the public stays bought in.

Published Nationcraft analyses include diagnostic playbooks for Venezuela’s post-Maduro reform window and Kazakhstan’s post-Soviet resource pivot, alongside cabinet-level advisory work on post-conflict recovery, reform-sequencing, and public-policy gamification. Chou also teaches the Octalysis methodology at Harvard, Stanford, Yale, Google, BCG, and IDEO — institutions where the human-systems lens applies whether the system is a product, a company, or a country.

His work has been cited by Harvard, Stanford, MIT, Forbes, Wall Street Journal, Wired, US Department of Energy, NIST, NSF, NCBI, US Department of Education, ClinicalTrials.gov, and Google Scholar — with 3,700+ more academic publications. Explore his books here.

This Cameroon analysis applies the Nationcraft Framework to a question I have watched derail reform across Central Africa more than once in advisory rooms: what happens to a resource-rich state when the governing system is one man and that man is mortal. Cameroon is the cleanest current case in the world of personalization outrunning institution-building, and the April 2026 succession maneuver is a live experiment in whether a strongman can engineer his own exit without dismantling the machine that made the exit dangerous.

Understanding Cameroon’s Governance Landscape Through Nationcraft

Most coverage of Cameroon treats Paul Biya’s longevity as a curiosity: the world’s oldest serving head of state, in power since November 1982, the only president most Cameroonians have ever known.¹ Nationcraft treats it as a structural variable with measurable downstream effects. When you score the country across all 18 nation variables, the longevity stops being a quirk and becomes the organizing logic of the entire profile.

The shape is unusual and instructive. Cameroon is not a poor country in the way Chad or Niger are poor. It has oil and gas, it has cocoa and cotton and timber, it has hydroelectric potential, and it has a workforce that is, by Central African standards, well-educated and bilingual. On the input side of the ledger, this is a country that should be a regional anchor. The Nationcraft diagnosis is that the conversion machinery is missing. Every variable that turns endowment into development sits at the floor of the scale: transparency, capital quality, commercial environment, infrastructure.

That gap between what a country has and what it can do with it is the single most important pattern the Nationcraft Framework was built to detect. Resources do not develop nations; institutions that convert resources develop nations. Cameroon in 2026 is a textbook case of a high-endowment, low-conversion state, and the succession crisis is what happens when the one institution that does function, the personalist presidency, reaches its biological limit.

What is the Nationcraft Framework?

The Nationcraft Framework is an 18-variable diagnostic for matching a country’s structural profile to the reform packets that have historically worked under similar conditions. It treats a nation the way behavioral design treats a complex system: not as a list of problems to fix one at a time, but as a configuration of interacting variables where the arrangement matters more than any single score.

The 18 variables span authority and culture (how power is held and how a society relates to it), capability (the quality of labor, capital, and institutions), and endowment (land, resources, geography, infrastructure). Each is scored from 1 to 9. The framework’s central claim — borrowed directly from the Octalysis work on motivation — is that configuration is strategy. You never average the scores. A country with high resources and low transparency is a fundamentally different machine from a country with low resources and high transparency, even if the two “average out” to the same number.

Against that profile, Nationcraft matches Success Packets: documented cases where a specific reform sequence worked, each tagged with the structural preconditions present when it was deployed. The discipline is in the matching. A packet that transformed one country will wreck another if the preconditions differ, which is why the framework spends as much energy on which playbooks to reject as on which to adopt. The same rigor runs through every analysis in the wider Nationcraft lattice, from a resource-state diagnosis like Bolivia’s gas dividend trap to a long-ruler study like Somalia’s mandate problem.

Why This Cameroon Variables Analysis Matters Right Now

The timing is not arbitrary. Three events in the past eight months have made Cameroon’s structural problem suddenly visible.

First, the October 2025 election. The official 53.66 percent for Biya against 35.19 percent for Tchiroma Bakary was rejected by the opposition, triggered protests that left dozens dead, and ended with the runner-up fleeing to The Gambia.¹² An election that produces a contested result, lethal repression, and an exiled challenger is not a legitimacy-conferring event. It is a legitimacy-spending one.

Second, the April 2026 constitutional amendment. Parliament voted 200 to 18, with 4 abstentions, to recreate the office of vice-president that Cameroon abolished in 1972 when it shifted from a federal to a unitary state.³ The new vice-president would be appointed by the president, dismissible at will, and would take over immediately on the president’s death, resignation, or incapacity, governing to the end of the mandate. The succession plumbing is being installed in public, which tells you the regime itself now treats the transition as the central risk.

Third, the economics are tightening underneath all of it. Real GDP growth sits around 3.5 to 3.7 percent, respectable on paper, but oil revenue is falling: Cameroon projected a 12.7 percent drop in 2025 oil and gas revenues, and royalties from the state hydrocarbons company are set to fall by tens of billions of CFA francs.⁵⁶ The rent that has greased the patronage system for four decades is shrinking exactly as the succession question arrives. That convergence is what makes 2026 the year the trap becomes legible.

The 18 Cameroon Nation Variables (2026)

Here is the full Nationcraft V-vector for Cameroon, drawn from the corpus and sanity-checked against World Bank, African Development Bank, Transparency International, and current-events reporting. Read it as a configuration, not a scorecard: the story is in which variables cluster high and which cluster low.

Stare at the bolded rows and the diagnosis writes itself. The high scores are V1 Authority, V14 Resources, and V15 Labor: a country with concentrated power, real natural wealth, and capable people. The low scores are V10, V13, V16, V17 and V18: no clean politics, no transparency, no capital, no business environment, no infrastructure. This is the signature of the Nationcraft pattern ET-001, the Resource Curse, wrapped around the pattern RC-003, the Authoritarian Succession Crisis. The next section explains why those two together produce the specific trap Cameroon is in.

The Indispensable-Man Trap: Why Longevity Manufactures Rupture

The intuitive story about Paul Biya is that his longevity has bought Cameroon stability. Four decades without a coup, without a civil war that toppled the center, without the regime-change churn that has battered neighbors. On the surface, V1 Authority at 8 looks like it is doing its job.

The Nationcraft reading is the opposite, and it turns on a single mechanism. Personalized authority is stabilizing only while the person is present. It is the most destabilizing possible arrangement at the moment of transition, because the system never built the thing that survives the person. A high V1 score with a low V13 Governance Transparency score and a low V10 Non-Partisanship score is not a sign of institutional strength. It is a sign that the institution is the man.

That is the Indispensable-Man Trap. The reason Cameroon has no obvious successor is not an accident of personnel; it is a designed feature. A patronage system (V10 at 2) rewards loyalty to a person, not loyalty to an office. An opaque revenue system (V13 at 2) means the spoils that hold the coalition together flow through informal channels that only the center can authorize. Together they guarantee that no rival can be allowed to accumulate independent standing, because an independent successor is, by definition, a threat. The system optimizes against the very thing it most needs.

This is where the April 2026 vice-president amendment becomes so revealing.³ On paper it answers the succession question: there will now be a designated person to step in. But read the variables. The vice-president is appointed by the president, serves at his pleasure, can be dismissed at any time, and exercises only delegated powers. That design keeps V1 Authority maximal and leaves V10 and V13 exactly where they are. It does not create an institution that survives the man. It creates a placeholder that the man fully controls until the instant he cannot. A circuit-breaker wired to the same fuse it is meant to protect is not a circuit-breaker.

Layer in the third pattern and the trap tightens. Cameroon also carries SC-001, the Ethnic Fragmentation Cascade, in the form of the Anglophone crisis: a separatist conflict in the North-West and South-West that has killed more than 6,500 people and displaced hundreds of thousands.⁷ A succession that goes wrong in a country already running an internal war is not a palace drama. It is a fault line meeting a tremor. The endowment that should make Cameroon a regional anchor (V14 at 7, V15 at 7) is precisely what raises the stakes of a disorderly transition, because there is so much worth fighting over and so little transparent process for dividing it.

Detailed Variable Justifications

The headline scores only matter if the per-variable reasoning holds. Here is the behavioral evidence behind the load-bearing variables, grouped by the cluster each belongs to.

The authority cluster: V1, V9, V10

V1 Authority Dynamics (8). Cameroon has had two presidents since independence in 1960.¹ Power flows from the presidency outward through appointments, and constitutional term limits were removed in 2008. An 8 reflects near-total personalization short of an absolute monarchy. The October 2025 repression and the April 2026 amendment are both expressions of an authority structure that treats the office and the man as one.

V13 Governance Transparency (2). Cameroon scored 26 out of 100 on Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, placing it in the bottom quartile globally.⁴ Oil revenues run through the state hydrocarbons company with limited public accounting, and the gap between the country’s endowment and its public-service delivery is the clearest behavioral marker of revenue capture. A 2 is not hyperbole; it is the floor that resource-curse states cluster around.

V10 Non-Partisanship vs Tribalism (2). The Francophone-Anglophone divide is the most visible fracture, but the deeper variable is patronage logic: access to the state is mediated by proximity to power, not by impartial rule. The Anglophone regions’ grievance, that a unitary, Francophone-dominated center marginalizes them, is the partisanship variable expressed as armed conflict. A 2 captures a polity organized around in-group capture rather than impartial institutions.

The endowment that raises the stakes: V14, V15

V14 Land and Resources (7) and V15 Labor Force Quality (7). These are the variables that make Cameroon’s case tragic rather than merely sad. The country has oil and gas, one of Central Africa’s most diversified agricultural bases (cocoa, cotton, bananas, coffee), significant timber and hydroelectric potential, and a literate, bilingual workforce with established universities. The inputs for a regional growth pole are present. The 7s are real, which is exactly why the 2s elsewhere are so costly.

The conversion floor: V13, V16, V17, V18

V16 Capital Quality (2), V17 Commercial Friendliness (2), V18 Utility Infrastructure (2). This is the conversion cluster, and it sits at the floor. Cameroon shares the Central African CFA franc and lacks an independent monetary lever or a sovereign-wealth buffer. The business environment is throttled by corruption costs and weak contract enforcement. Power, roads and water remain unreliable outside the main cities. Each of these is downstream of V13: when revenue is captured, it does not get reinvested into the public goods that would raise V16, V17 and V18.

The variable most exposed to a botched succession: V7

V7 Stability vs Turmoil (4). The two insurgencies (the Anglophone conflict in the west and Boko Haram in the Far North, the latter responsible for thousands of deaths and a quarter-million displaced) would argue for a lower score.⁸ A 4 rather than a 2 reflects that the central state retains broad territorial control and macroeconomic continuity; the turmoil is severe but regionally contained. This is the variable most exposed to a botched succession.

Best-Match Historical Packets

This is where Nationcraft earns its keep. The temptation with a high-endowment state is to reach for the famous transformation stories. Most of them are precisely wrong for Cameroon’s configuration. The discipline is to reject the misfit packets first, then adopt the ones whose preconditions actually match.

Packets Cameroon’s reformers should reject

SP-002, the Lee Kuan Yew Industrialization Packet. Singapore is the most over-prescribed model in the developing world, and it is a category error here. The LKY packet ran on an incorruptible meritocratic bureaucracy: Singapore scored V13 Governance Transparency at 8 even at its 1965 starting line. The packet presupposes clean institutions; it does not manufacture them. Drop it into a V13=2, V10=2 state and you get the aesthetics of a developmental autocracy with none of the engine. The stress-test of why this packet holds in its home soil is worked through in the Singapore LKY analysis; the preconditions simply are not present in Yaoundé.

SP-037, the Saudi Vision 2030 Transformation Packet. Vision 2030 is a sovereign-wealth play: it spends down enormous fiscal reserves (Saudi V14 Resources at 10, V16 Capital at 6) to buy a transition. Cameroon scores V16 at 2, runs a declining oil base, and has no fund to draw on. A reform that requires firepower Cameroon does not have is not a strategy; it is a wish.

SP-007, the Estonia Digital Revolution Packet. Estonia leapfrogged into a digital state on the back of V13 Transparency at 7, V15 Labor at 8, and extreme institutional adaptability. The digital-government dream founders in Cameroon on V18 Utility Infrastructure at 2 and V13 at 2: you cannot build a trusted e-state on unreliable power and an untrusted bureaucracy.

SP-013, the Atatürk Reforms Packet. The Turkish founding model depended on a unifying nationalism and a founding-rupture monopoly that let one leader impose a new identity. Cameroon’s V11 Diversity at 3 and its live Anglophone fracture mean there is no single national myth to monopolize, and the incumbency is exhausted rather than freshly legitimating. The packet’s precondition, a credible founding mandate, is absent.

SP-053, the Azerbaijan Oil Fund and Authoritarianism Packet. This is the most dangerous misfit, because it is the one the regime is most likely to be tempted by. Azerbaijan paired an oil fund with a dynastic, father-to-son succession and called it stability. But Azerbaijan ran on V11 Homogeneity at 7 and an oil-fund scale Cameroon cannot match. Copying the dynastic-succession instinct without the homogeneity or the fund does not buy Cameroon stability. It deepens the Indispensable-Man Trap and adds a legitimacy crisis on top. The dynastic-succession instinct shows up across the corpus, and it consistently postpones rather than resolves the problem, as the Philippines dynasty analysis documents in a very different setting.

Packets Cameroon’s reformers should actually study

SP-004, Botswana, is the aspirational anchor. At independence in 1966, Botswana had 12 kilometers of paved road and 22 university graduates, and was one of the poorest countries on earth. When diamonds were discovered, the difference from the resource-curse path was a single deliberate choice: build a transparent revenue-management institution before the money arrived in earnest. Botswana’s V13 climbed to 7 and the diamonds became a blessing rather than a curse. Cameroon’s endowment is comparable; its V13 is not. SP-004 names the one variable Cameroon must repair first, and it is not the size of the resource base. It is the transparency of the revenue.

SP-040, Senegal, is the succession lesson. Senegal is the Francophone West African case that did the opposite of Cameroon: Léopold Senghor stepped down voluntarily in 1980 and handed power to Abdou Diouf, establishing that the office outranks the man. Senegal’s V10 Non-Partisanship at 7 reflects a polity that built transition norms instead of personalizing power. For Cameroon, the lesson is exact: an orderly succession is a rules problem, not a personnel problem, and rules have to be built before they are needed.

SP-036, Oman, is the proof that a strongman can de-risk his own exit. Sultan Qaboos ran a maximal-authority state (V1 at 10), but he used that authority to build institutions and infrastructure (V17 climbed to 7) and to pre-arrange a clear, accepted succession that executed smoothly on his death in 2020. Oman shows that a high-V1 personalist system is not doomed to the trap. It is doomed only if the ruler uses the authority to prevent succession rather than to engineer it. That is the single most important counterfactual available to Cameroon’s regime right now.

Strategic Implications for the 2026-2030 Window

The next four years are the window in which the trap either springs or is defused. Three implications follow directly from the V-vector.

First, the binding constraint is trust, not money. With V13 at 2 and V17 at 2, Cameroon cannot attract the long-horizon capital that would turn V14 and V15 into growth. Even as oil rent declines, the answer is not to chase a new resource windfall; it is to make the existing revenue legible. A Botswana-style transparency reform is the highest-return move available, because it unlocks every other variable downstream.

Second, the succession mechanism on offer is necessary but insufficient. A vice-presidency is better than a vacuum, but a delegated, dismissible deputy keeps the whole edifice contingent on one man’s choices until the moment of his absence. The Oman counterfactual is the upgrade path: convert the deputy from a placeholder into a genuinely empowered, publicly accepted successor with an independent base of legitimacy. That requires the regime to do the one thing the trap is built to prevent — let a successor accumulate real standing.

Third, the Anglophone fracture is the accelerant. Any transition attempted while SC-001 Ethnic Fragmentation is live carries the risk that a contested center invites the periphery to break. Sequencing a credible dialogue on the North-West and South-West regions is not a side issue to be handled after the succession; it is a precondition for the succession not turning into a wider rupture. The comparative cases make this concrete: states that attempted reform while carrying an unresolved internal cleavage, such as the dynamics traced in the Ethiopia Nobel-laureate analysis, found that the cleavage, not the reform program, determined the outcome.

Governance Strategy Recommendations

Sequencing is the entire discipline. The point of a Nationcraft recommendation is not a wish list; it is an order of operations dictated by which constraints bind first. Run these in the wrong order and each step undermines the next.

The thread through every phase is that transparency comes first because it is the variable everything else depends on. A reform program that starts with diversification or digital government, the glamorous end of the list, fails because it tries to build on V13 at 2. The same lesson runs through the resource-state corpus, from Venezuela’s eight-rejected reform playbooks to Argentina’s pampas paradox: endowment without trust is a curse, not an asset.

Comparative Context: Cameroon vs Chad, Angola, Botswana

Cameroon’s situation is sharpest when set against three neighbors and near-peers who started in similar places and diverged. The comparison is not decoration; it is the empirical content of the framework’s claim that configuration, not endowment, decides outcomes.

The table makes the argument the whole analysis has been building toward. Cameroon, Chad and Angola share the high-authority, low-transparency, high-resource signature, and all three produced captured revenue and succession crises. Botswana shared the resource endowment and almost nothing else, and the single variable that differed — V13 Governance Transparency at 7 instead of 2 — is the one that flipped the outcome. Cameroon’s neighbor to the east, Chad, is the cautionary mirror: a 30-year personalist ruler whose death in 2021 produced a forced dynastic handover, not an orderly transition. The Nationcraft point is uncomfortable but precise: Cameroon’s fate is not written by its oil. It is written by whether it repairs V13 before the succession arrives.

The Nationcraft Framework in Practice

What makes Cameroon a clean teaching case for the Nationcraft Framework is how cleanly the variables separate cause from symptom. The headlines — a contested election, an exiled challenger, a hastily rewritten constitution — are symptoms. The cause is a configuration: V1 Authority at 8 with V13 Transparency at 2 and V10 Non-Partisanship at 2. Once you see the configuration, the events stop being surprising and start being predictable.

This is the discipline the framework imposes everywhere. It refuses to average a country into a single grade, and it refuses to prescribe a famous playbook without checking the preconditions. The same method that flags Singapore’s packet as a misfit for Cameroon is what lets it identify when a packet genuinely transfers, as in the post-Soviet resource-state reasoning of the Kazakhstan steppes pivot or the bailout-cycle diagnosis in the Ghana analysis. A framework that cannot say “no” to an attractive but wrong model is not a framework; it is a brochure.

The deeper reason the same lens applies to a product, a company, and a country is motivational. Reform is, at bottom, a problem of getting large numbers of people to keep moving through difficulty without losing faith that the destination is real. That is the question Octalysis was built to answer for users, and Nationcraft extends it to citizens. The full set of country diagnoses, including coercion-and-control studies like the Iran coercion spiral, sits in the Nationcraft library for readers who want to see the method run across very different configurations.

Explore More Nationcraft Analyses

Cameroon joins a growing library of country-by-country Nationcraft diagnoses, each running the same 18-variable method against a different national configuration. Browse the full collection in the Nationcraft Nation Variables Library, or start with the foundational page-length variable analyses for the United States and Ukraine, which work the framework at maximum depth.

Related Reading

• The Nationcraft Framework: 18 Variables, 8 Goals, 100+ Proven Packets
• Nationcraft Nation Variables Library
• How the Octalysis Framework Applies to Nation-Building
• Nationcraft Analysis: Cuba Doctrine Trap 2026
• Nationcraft Analysis: Pakistan SIFC Trap 2026
• Nationcraft Analysis: South Korea Post-Martial Trap 2026

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the Indispensable-Man Trap in Cameroon’s 2026 succession crisis?

It is the Nationcraft finding that the personalization which should guarantee control (V1 Authority Dynamics at 8) is what makes the coming transition catastrophic. Biya has ruled 43 years; the patronage and opacity machine he built (V10 at 2, V13 at 2) cannot reproduce itself, so a richly endowed nation (V14 at 7) is hostage to one 93-year-old’s mortality. The April 2026 vice-president amendment tries to install a circuit-breaker without surrendering the personalization that created the risk.

Why is the Botswana Diamond Management Packet (SP-004) the right anchor for Cameroon?

SP-004 is the proof that a resource-rich African state can convert endowment into development. Botswana started in 1966 with almost no infrastructure, then built a clean revenue-management institution (V13 rose to 7) around diamond wealth. Cameroon’s endowment is comparable (V14 at 7), but its V13 sits at 2. SP-004 names the missing variable Cameroon must repair first: transparency of resource revenue, not more resource revenue.

Why is Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore packet (SP-002) a misfit for Cameroon?

SP-002 runs on an incorruptible meritocratic bureaucracy: Singapore scored V13 at 8 even in 1965. Cameroon scores V13 at 2 and V10 at 2. The LKY packet presupposes clean institutions; it does not create them. Importing it into a V13=2 state produces the form of a developmental autocracy with none of the function.

Does the April 2026 vice-president amendment solve the succession problem?

On the Nationcraft reading it manages the optics without changing the variables that make succession dangerous. The vice-president is appointed by the president, dismissible at will, and exercises only delegated power. That keeps V1 maximal and leaves V10 and V13 untouched. A circuit-breaker that depends entirely on the man it is meant to replace is a continuation of the trap, not an escape from it.

What should Cameroon reform first according to the V-vector?

Sequencing follows the binding constraints: make resource revenue transparent (repair V13 from 2) using the Botswana template; institutionalize a real, rules-based succession path (the Senegal and Oman lesson) rather than a delegated deputy; only then attempt the commercial-environment and infrastructure rebuild (V17 and V18). Diversification and digital-state ambitions come last, because they fail without trust and power.

Footnotes

1. International Crisis Group, “Defusing Cameroon’s Dangerous Electoral Standoff,” and Wikipedia, “2025 Cameroonian protests” (official result Biya 53.66%, Tchiroma 35.19%; Biya in power since 1982). crisisgroup.org; en.wikipedia.org
2. Al Jazeera, “Four killed in Cameroon as protests intensify ahead of presidential results,” and Chatham House analysis of post-election repression. aljazeera.com; chathamhouse.org
3. Human Rights and Legal Research Centre, “Paul Biya’s Constitutional Revision: Cameroon’s Succession Rules Rewritten,” and Bloomberg, “World’s Oldest Ruler in Cameroon Is Working on a Succession Plan” (VP amendment approved April 2026, 200-18-4). hrlrc.org; bloomberg.com
4. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2024 — Cameroon (score 26/100). transparency.org
5. World Bank, “Cameroon Overview,” and African Development Bank, “Cameroon Economic Outlook” (real GDP growth ~3.5-3.7%, inflation ~4.1% mid-2025). worldbank.org; afdb.org
6. Business in Cameroon, “Cameroon Projects 12.7% Drop in 2025 Oil and Gas Revenues” (SNH royalties projected to fall ~74.7 billion CFA). businessincameroon.com
7. International Crisis Group, Cameroon country page, and Institute for Security Studies, “Time to resolve Cameroon’s persistent yet forgotten crisis” (Anglophone conflict 6,500+ killed, hundreds of thousands displaced). crisisgroup.org; issafrica.org
8. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Cameroon page (Boko Haram in the Far North: 3,000+ killed, ~250,000 displaced). globalr2p.org

WOULD YOU LIKE YU-KAI CHOU TO WORK WITH YOUR ORGANIZATION?